BIOGRAPHIC REGISTER

At one time or another over the years officials of various US agencies have expressed a desire for a "national biographic center"--a single repository for the collection of all positive biographic intelligence. Such a center has never come to pass, but during its 20-year existence (1947-67) the Biographic Register (BR) of OCR came closest to it, acquiring first the community responsibility for data on scientific personalities and later that for biographic information on all except military figures. Of the four OCR Registers (BR, GR, IR, SR) it was the largest and by far the best known.

Background

By the end of World War II duplication of biographic information on foreign nationals was widespread in the US Government. No attempt had ever been made to coordinate the activities of the various intelligence agencies in Washington and their representatives abroad concerned with the collection, control and production of such information. As of 1 January 1946, OSS had a Biographical Records Section staffed by 33 people; State had a Personal Intelligence Section with 34; and Army had a Who's Who Branch, which at one point during the 1942-45 period had as many as 80. In January 1946 the picture changed: The OSS and State sections merged to form the Division of Biographic Information (BI) in the Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR), Department of State. The War Depart-

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ment's Who's Who Branch was abolished, and its files were

transferred to PI.

CIG 16

Consolidating the files had not solved the prob-

lem of biographic coordination, however. Therefore,

one of the first tasks that the newly created ICAPS

took up in mid-1946 was the development of a "Plan for

Coordination of Biographic Intelligence." The result

was CIG Directive No. 16. It provided for

> ...allocation of primary responsibilities for
> reporting biographic data, producing biographic
> intelligence, and maintaining comprehensive
> supporting files on various categories of per-
> sonalities...to the intelligence agencies rep-
> resented on the Intelligence Advisory Board....

These primary responsibilities were assigned as follows:

political, cultural, sociological, economic and inter-

national personalities to State; military and naval

figures to the War and Navy Departments, respectively;

and scientific personalities to "each agency as jointly

agreed or in accordance with categories above." (CIG 16 p.1)

The Directive further stated that each agency was to

> ...produce and evaluate biographic intelligence on
> personalities within its own categories of primary
> responsibility for the other agencies requesting
> and authorized to receive same, or if desired, to
> make available the appropriate source material.

It went on to outline procedures for coordination of bio-

graphic activities in the field, delegating the chief

responsibility for such coordination to the Chief of

Mission at each post. (CIG 16 p.2) Finally, it stated,

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The Director of Central Intelligence will
undertake to exploit, for the benefit of CIG and
the departmental agencies, sources of biographic
information from Government agencies not rep-
resented on the IAB, and will maintain such other
biographic files within CIG as he deems necessary
to comply with the President's directive. (CIG 16 p.4)

The planners had originally tried to incorporate into

CIG 16 a requirement for the establishment within CIG of a

Central Biographic Reference File, which would contain

basic factual data on all individuals on whom the other

agencies maintained supporting files. This file was to

be kept on business machine cards. Such an arrangement

was obviously desirable, inasmuch as no agency then had

a master index of its own files, much less of those of

any other agency or department. Complete agreement on

the system could not be reached, however, and it became

obvious that more time was needed--after all, CIG was

still only a fledgling, and the biographic unit was not

even out of the egg. CIG 16 was therefore approved

without the central reference file provision, while planning

for such a file continued.

The logical place for the biographic index was the

reference facility being developed within ORE. By June

1947 ICAPS had approved the mission and functions of the

Reference Branch, and it was in operation. One of its

elements was the Biographical Intelligence Register (BIR--
apparently when OCD and the Reference Branch merged in
it became BR, apparently with no fanfare, in mid-1948).

Its job, according to a memorandum of 29 May 1947 from Dr.

then Acting Chief of the Reference Branch,

was to cross index and record information on key foreign

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individuals and foreign organizations, including govern-

ment structure, for future reference and compilation." (Addicott memo)

The
Early Days ▬▬▬

For some time BIR shared with the rest of the

Reference Branch problems related to staffing, or-

ganization and development of procedures. Competition

within CIG for first-class employees was keen, and the

Reference Branch was low in priority compared with the

production offices. BIR therefore accumulated a staff

that by 1952 was described by its Chief [   ] as   25X1A

"only slightly above average." [   ] memo 26/2/52)   25X1A

Numerous changes were made in the planned T/O for BIR

as procedures and functions were developed. The final

figure for 1947 was apparently 23. Changes also

occurred in the structuring of the Register. When it

began operations in 1947, BIR contained an Office of

the Chief (occupied, as noted in Volume I of this

History, by a series of temporary incumbents until

January 1949) and the Intelligence and Index Sections.

Throughout 1947 BIR officials visited other govern-

ment departments all over Washington and even in other

cities to survey biographic holdings and gather both

ideas and actual material. On 28 July 1947 [   ]   25X1A

submitted the first BIR monthly progress report. In it

he stated, "This Register is prepared to process any bio-

graphic material which may be received providing the vol-

ume does not exceed the production capacity of our present

personnel." In that month BIR processed into its files

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information on 1,360 individuals and answered 35 requests.
(July report) It also began work on a special project for
the Scientific Branch, ORE, collecting and processing all
information available in the IAB agencies on scientific
personnel working in Russian territory. This project was
eventually to lead to NSCID 8, which in 1948 gave CIA
/CIG became CIA in July 1947/ the community responsibility
for biographic coverage of foreign scientific and technical
personalities.

BIR was not able to confine itself for long to merely
collecting and machine-processing biographic data. Other
Agency offices were more and more often requiring bio-
graphic reports on foreign personalities, primarily in the
political and related fields. It was State that was re-
sponsible for providing this data, in accordance with CIG 16
information, but State/BI was short of personnel and usually claimed
that it could not cope with the volume of CIA requests. In
effect, CIG 16 had given State an out by offering the
Department the option of "making available the appropriate
source material" instead of providing reports.

Analysts in BIR therefore began to collect data on
political figures and to write biographic reports on an
"emergency" basis for Agency requesters. They were never to give up the latter
function, although various Management Office surveyors of
the Register would recommend from time to time that they
should stick to the routine indexing and filing of the
information and leave the production of intelligence to
those offices meant to do it, thus saving time and obviating
the necessity for hiring more professional employees. This

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insistence on assigning a strictly reference function to
the Register was to create problems for years to come,
particularly in retaining qualified, educated personnel,
who soon resented being considered second-class citizens
by the production office analysts and others who looked
down on "the reference types."

By October 1947 BIR was fairly well established, and
a list of its functions was drawn up. The Intelligence
Section, among other things, planned long-range projects;
planned and reviewed special research reports;/contacted
                                                  and
government and nongovernment offices, including libraries
and research institutions to ascertain the availability of
pertinent biographic material. The Section's Analysis Unit
analyzed the incoming documents to see if they should be
retained; prepared bibliographies, research papers and
special research reports in response to requests; and
analyzed biographic intelligence material of other insti-
tutions throughout the United States to determine its use-
fulness. The Master File Unit filed the documents; handled
requests for direct reference to the original source and
verified information, dates, etc.; and maintained a Flexoline
file for the purpose of identifying documents and assigning
case numbers (individual identification numbers) to them.

The Index Section directed methods of coding, machine
operations and overall processing; analyzed procedural prob-
lems in the control of biographic intelligence so far as the
punch card method and coding were concerned; and collaborated
with representatives of other branches in conducting surveys

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to determine further uses of punch card methods in recording biographic intelligence. The Code Unit within the Section established, reviewed and revised code structures; classified material in accordance with established codes so that intelligence could be recorded on punch cards; maintained a library of the entire organization file by country for reference purposes; and maintained control of documents received and the number of individual items coded. The Machine Unit punched and verified all material to be included in the biographic punch card files; serviced those files through machine techniques; and prepared listings and statistical reports. (1/10/47 pers. reqmts)

The Scientific Responsibility--NSCID 8

CIG 16, as noted, had given no specific responsibility for scientific personality coverage, and this field soon became confused and neglected. Apparently, as long as noone had the responsibility, noone wanted it. During their work on the special scientific project for Scientific Branch mentioned earlier, BIR analysts found that much duplication of effort in compiling data on foreign scientists existed among the various IAC agencies. Meanwhile, they were building up what would soon be the most complete file available among the IAC agencies on scientists believed to be in Russian territory--a file that in the end contained some 10,000 names. With this file BIR could locate dossiers on individuals, whether filed by the State,

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With such a file BIR became a natural home for community responsibility for scientific personalities. After considerable discussion with biographic analysts in the other IAC agencies, BIR proposed for ICAPS consideration that CIA assume primary responsibility for the maintenance of biographic data on foreign scientific personalities.

ICAPS responded favorably to the proposal, and on 25 May 1948 NSCID 8 (old series) was issued. It assigned to CIA as a service of common concern the primary responsibility for the maintenance of biographic data on foreign scientific and technological figures and for furnishing information on such figures upon request from any member of the intelligence community. (NSCID 8) Even before the Directive was issued, BR /the name changed around this time/ had begun to prepare for the reorientation of its operations. Because it still had to go on servicing CIA analysts without interruption, it temporarily discontinued various other projects, such as that of indexing the holdings of the State Department (evidently begun during the scientific project). All analysts that could be spared were set to combing the files of the IAC agencies for information on scientific personalities to be indexed into CIA's files.

The assumption of the scientific responsibility was to solve many problems but create numerous new ones, though most would be resolved in time. Virtually everyone in BR was helping to integrate into the files the backlog of scientific data of the other agencies. As a result, the operations of the Register were reduced to little more than a mechanical process, the routine aspects of which caused a serious morale problem among

the professional employees. Analysts were also concerned because the old data they were integrating into their files was so fragmentary and undigested that its value seemed limited when measured against the loss of time for current material.

Furthermore, when RR began taking over the files of the other agencies (beginning with Scientific Branch, Department of the Navy) a new method of recording data was initiated, which transferred all dossiers to a machine system by requiring that all biographical data obtained be transcribed onto machine cards that could be punched as to name, nationality and case number. This system would make biographic facts readily available by machine sorting and would facilitate repro-duction of data on large numbers of individuals by means of the Telefax process (still not in operation), but it allowed for virtually no flexibility with reference to material processed,and it required complex controls. The procedure was slow and involved and was drastically cur-tailing the number of persons processed. Most important, perhaps, was that the routineness of the operation made it difficult for the Register to obtain and keep qualified

25X1A personnel. (28 Sep 48 [   ] memo)

OCD officials were well aware of the condition of the Register. In late September 1948 the AD/CD [   ]   25X1A described it as "in poor shape, working ineffectively, and suffering from poor morale." He therefore considered it of utmost importance that "a proper head man" be located for RR as soon as possible. His choice for the job was Dr.

25X1A [   ]

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described [____] as a man

with very broad knowledge of science and
scientists, much experience and an excel-
lemt reputation in dealing with scientists,
and the reputation of being a driver who
can drive without creating resentment in
his subordinates. (21 Sep 48 memo)

[____] arrived in January 1949. His inheritance was

a collection of data on some [_____], of whom

about two-thirds were scientific; an index of dossiers

available in other government agencies that listed about

[_____] and a T/O of [_____] over half of whom

were brand new to the Register.

The Register began to sort itself out--a painstaking,

rather agonizing process. One major undertaking concerned

the dossier system. The disadvantages of the rigid machine

~~dossier~~ system have been mentioned, ∧ The use of folders for all
and BR apparently discontinued it in short order.

individuals also created problems, however, primarily with

regard to space availability. In May 1949 BR began the use

of 5x8 McBee Keysort cards, on which extracted data were

entered, leaving the creation of hard-copy folders for those

individuals on whom a great deal of information had been

accumulated.

The system of using folders and McBee cards continued

in existence as long as the Register did. For each dossier
(McBees, were considered to be dossiers)
~~(and McBee)~~ certain information was coded and punched into
as well as folders,

IBM cards, which could later be used to obtain various machine

listings. The dossiers were assigned case numbers and filed in

numerical order in the Master File; each country analyst
had a machine listing of the dossiers for his area, which
was periodically updated.

Shortly after the establishment of the dossier system,
it became apparent that unless BR wanted to struggle per-
petually with a large unindexed backlog it would have to
develop a second index and retrieval system to control
multiname documents of marginal intelligence interest.
The first system adopted consisted of merely underlining
the desired names in the document and applying a three-
digit code for citizenship and an alpha-numeric code for
document source. An IBM punch card was prepared for each
name in the document, and the analyst was furnished with
an alphabetic machine listing that was periodically
updated. All documents were filed in the respective area
sections chronologically by date.

As the volume in these files increased, name identi-
fication from a machine index containing only name and
citizenship became increasingly difficult, and a search of
the necessary documents for possible hits became impractical.
For these reasons, this system, known as File 2, was dis-
continued in favor of the Selected Reference Index (SRI),
which differed only in the number of coded items appearing
in the machine index to aid in name identification. Later,
when the Register started to process the names appearing in
some 100 German-language periodicals received each month, it
was decided to use an expanded SRI system for the latter
material, which became known as the Open Reference Index (ORI). (BR Syst.)

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When the scientific responsibility was assigned to CIA,
the operational part of the Register was reorganized into
Regional and Scientific Branches, each with 18 slots. (3 sept 48 T/O)
Each branch now did what the old Intelligence Section as
a whole had done--analyzed incoming documents,decided how to
process them, began processing, and received customer
requests. The Index Branch continued to provide machine and
other support.

The Regional Branch soon became badly overloaded.
Although the slots allotted to the Scientific Branch were
adequate for processing the requests it received, those given
to the Regional Branch definitely were not. A particularly
heavy request load for political figures came from the
Special Research Center and the Office of Policy Coor-
dination. State/BI continued to make its files available
but to cry the no-staff-no-time blues when it came to
actually writing reports for CIA requesters. Many members of the
Regional Branch staff had come from the old State, OSS or
G-2 biographic offices, but experienced as they were, they
still could not cope with the request load. OCD sought
an increase in the T/O of the branch and in August 1950
received it--20 positions for Regional Branch; 19 for
Scientific. (Aug 50 T/O)

At the same time, the Regional Branch was reorganized.
two Sections --
Originally divided into Eastern and Western ~~Sections~~, it was
now broken into four ~~sections~~--EE/USSR, Far East, Western,
Near East-Africa. (Aug 50T/O) At the same time, the Index

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Branch was regrouped from four into two sections. The new components were the Classification Section and the Machine and Records Section, which contained the Key Punch, Machine and Master File Units. (Aug 50 T/O)

While all of this reorganization was going on, a new statement of mission and functions for BR was drawn up. The mission was stated as follows:

> The Chief...is charged with providing bio-graphic information on foreign scientists and tech-nicians required to support the intelligence ac-tivities of the government, as well as infor-mation on all types of personalities required to support the intelligence and operational mission of the Agency.

Some of BR's functions were to:

1. Maintain a central file of dossiers containing

information on foreign scientists and technicians of

interest or potential significance to national intelligence, and on other individuals not reported elsewhere who figured significantly in national intelligence analysis.

2. Maintain, by category, machine records of indi-viduals on whom the Register had dossiers.

3. Maintain a central machine record of nonscientists identified in intelligence reports of other government agencies indexed to source of information.

4. Provide biographic reports on scientists and tech-nicians to any requester authorized to receive them and on foreigners of any type to Agency requesters.

5. Provide machine listings of individuals in BR files by

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various categories or listings of document or file ref-

erences of selected individuals identified by the Register

but not kept in its dossier file. (6 July 50 memo from Mgt Off)

At the time this set of missions and functions was written,

percent on scientific

figures). It also had a general index, based on IBM tech-

niques, maintained for the purpose of locating and ordering

information contained in the substantive records of the

Register according to selected aspects of biographic material

such as occupation, citizenship, country of residence; and

several indexes to unassimilated biographic material reposing

in CIA and to holdings of outside agencies. The latter

included a card index of miscellaneous wartime records, an

IBM Name Source Index, and a State Department Dossier Index.

The first of these latter three indexes was a heterogeneous

collection of 41,000 cards inherited from certain wartime

agencies and including some captured material. Most of the

cards contained fragmentary data and followed no pattern as to

ooverage by categories (i.e., political, military, subversive).

New material was not added to this file, and it was being

gradually absorbed into dossier records. The IBM Name

Source Index was designed to provide the means of locating

material relating to persons of intelligence interest named in a

wide variety of intelligence documents that BR received but

did not process into dossier records because they were not

related directly to the mission of the division or could

not be handled because of limitations in time and personnel.

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The scope of this operations was strictly that of identifying a name

with a source document. As of 27 July 1950 the file totaled

about [   ]   25X1

individuals.

The State Department Index carried the name and citizenship

of persons upon whom State/BI maintained dossiers. Its

primary uses were to provide BI with a master list of its

dossier holdings and to permit the rapid preparation of

country listings for departmental and Foreign Service

25X1A   Officers. I[   ] (27 July 50 memo)

In 1950 RR initiated a long-term program to collect data

on foreign scientific and technological students studying in

the United States. Usually, covert arrangements with govern-   25X1A

[   ]

of OCR by the time maintenance of the file ceased in early 1968.

25X1A   In January 1951[   ]Chief of the BR Scientific

25X1A   Branch, was sent to[   ] to survey the bio-

graphic files maintained by US agencies in the European

Theater on foreign scientific and technological personalities

and to obtain the permission of the responsible authorities

for CIA to microfilm such files or sections thereof as were

found to be of intelligence interest. As a result of his 6-

week tour of 11 installations, BR acquired some 228,600 files

(primarily cards) in their original form and 66,850 more that

were later microfilmed. ([   ]trip report)   25X1A

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January 1951 also marked the beginning of BR's largest service project to date--a register of Soviet scientists that would provide an instantaneous reference available to all government agencies. At that time there was no such register in existence that gave more than a partial list of scientific and technological personnel of the USSR, though such bio-graphic information was a daily requirement of OSI and of numerous other offices. The end product of the project was OCD's first biographic Research Aid-- CD#1, Soviet Men of Science (SMOS), published in May 1952 and containing data on some

25X1A

(SMOS was so useful that in 1959 a second edition was published, which covered nearly

25X1A

By early 1952 BR was again suffering under inequitable distribution of workload, with its attendant problems of low morale among the staff. In the 2 years since the first increase in the Regional Branch, the Scientific Branch staff had also been increased, and the two were once more equal in slots but unequal in amount of work. The Chief of BR pointed out that this was due to a reluctance on a higher level to recognize that the intelligence demands of CIA on the Regional Branch were unique and exceeded in number and variety those levied against the Scientific Branch. This reluctance, he said, was based in part on the false assumption that State/BI could, if absolutely necessary, backstop BR, and in part on the "apparently overwhelming influence of NSCID 8." [   ] memo 25/2/52) 25X1A

Another impasse had been reached, but with each new problem it became more obvious that something had to be done

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25X1

soon to resolve the problem of the demands for non-

scientific information. Finally, something was done.

Arrangement with State

Around mid-1952 the Chief of State/BI informally

suggested that CIA cease processing biographic intelligence

on political personalities and that CIA provide for State/BI

enough funds for the latter to meet all CIA requirements

for intelligence of this sort. CIA's Office of Intelligence

Coordination then studied the situation and recommended

acceptance of State's proposal. [   ] the AD/CD   25X1A

objected to the proposal, feeling that the disadvantages

would, in the long run, outweigh the advantages. His most

serious objections were that such an arrangement would

perpetuate the existing dispersal of biographic files,

rather than contributing to the eventual merger of all

such files in one place (preferably PR, when it had enough

space to accomodate them), and that once State started getting

CIA money, it would diminish its own allocations to BI and

increase its demands for CIA support. (22 Sep 52 memo)

25X1A   [   ]oice of dissent was not strong enough. The

DDI approved the proposal subject to the working out of

arrangements with State, and on 5 November 1952[   ]   25X1A

25X1A   [   ]DDI/CIA; and W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assis-

tant, Intelligence, Department of State; and Lawrence G.

Houston, General Counsel, CIA, signed an agreement. State/BI

agreed to provide complete biographic service to CIA on

foreign political, sociological and cultural personalities,

in return for which CIA agreed to make funds available to BI,

in accordance with Section 6 (a), Public Law 110, computed on the

basis of the additional costs incurred by State in servicing

CIA requests. (agrément)

It was determined that State would need 27 positions,

at an annual cost of $130,000 to discharge its new respon-

25X1A

sibilities. [   ] CIA continued to maintain the

political files it held for a short time, while State

recruited new personnel, but beginning in March 1953 all

the PR political files were shifted to State/PI, after which

PR was once again reorganized, and its mission was restated.

The restated mission was

> To provide to authorized recipients in the
> intelligence community biographic information
> on all foreign scientific, technical, industrial
> and economic personalities and the organizations
> with which they were affiliated.

25X1A

PR's Chief (he had taken over from [   ] in
1952; see Volume I
for details)

25X1A

To carry out this mission, [   ], /after consul-

tation with his Branch Chiefs, reorganized the Register

along geographical rather than functional lines. Each

geographic unit was a complete entity, responsible for

all information regardless of its nature--scientific,

economic or organizational, and each analyst was expected

to undertake all aspects of the PR mission in his area.

The new division of labor was along the following

lines: a Soviet Branch, a Non-Soviet Branch, a Support

Branch (classification by category of biographic and

organizational information as well as coordination and

administration of those functions that could best be

handled centrally, such as publications, reference facilities

and international organizations), and an Index Branch

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(maintenance of dossier file, control and dissemination
of intelligence routed to the Register, general clerical
work).

1952-61--New Files and New Services

No major upheavals occurred in BR for the next 9
years. The 1952-61 period was devoted to developing
new files, as needs for special collections arose, and
expanding services.

It was probably in this period, though it may have
been earlier, that BR analysts began to supplement the
dossier and machine files with a manually controlled
5x8 card file. This became the repository for infor-
mation received on an individual if the data were not
sufficient for a dossier, if the names were not impor-
tant enough to index in detail, or if the material
arrived in card form. The card file soon became and was
to remain one of the three major files maintained by
the Register (the first, of course, having been the
dossier file).

The third most important BR file got its start in
late 1952. This was the Sovbloc Bibliographic Card File.
It resulted from an OSI study prepared in September 1952
that recommended establishment in the Agency of a biblio-
graphic file of Soviet scientific articles, arranged by
the name and institutional affiliation of the author. The
responsibility for developing such a file naturally fell to
BR, which immediately undertook an investigation of possible

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sources of material. The basis of the file was drawn

from an arrangement with the Air Technical Intelligence

Center (ATIC), Wright Field, Ohio, which had contracted

for the receipt of such bibliographic data from the

Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio (this

contract was known as Project White Stork). Subsequently,

the major source of cards was the Library of Congress

MLRA program (see chapter of this History on the CIA Library

for details on the MLRA). Contracts with other

research institutes and libraries yielded still more

cards over the years.

The Biblio File, which was manually controlled,

consisted of two sets of 5x8 cards, one filed by name

of author and the other by organizational affiliation, ~~if~~

~~known~~, as OSI had asked. Each card contained the author's

name, the title of the article or book, the date of pub-

lication, and the name of the publishing house or the

title of the journal, as well as the journal volume,

issue and page numbers. Many cards also contained an

abstract or even the full text of the article. By early

1954 this file contained [   ] by 1960 over

25X1A

[   ] Other BR area

desks developed similar files, especially in Eastern

Europe, but none were as voluminous or as important as

the Sovbloc file. (Microfilming of the Sovbloc file began in the mid-1960's.)

In September 1953 PR published CD #8--German/Austrian

Scientists and Technicians in the USSR--a monumental and

extremely valuable work, which evolved in a manner similar

to ~~the evolution of~~ SMOS into a reference work for many

25X1

potential requesters. The basis for the publication

scientific and technical per-

sonnel in the USSR. On a continuing basis, the Register

forwarded to the requester over 4,500 reports.

The personnel in question were considered to be of

particular interest to all scientific and technical intel-

ligence offices, not just the Reception Center, and

considerable enthusiasm was expressed within CIA and

other IAC members for the formal publication of the

information. During the project the reports had been

brought under extensive IBM machine control, which made

possible the alphabetic arrangement of the biographic

summaries and the preparation of a number of indexes to

the names involved. In September 1953 the compilation

of reports, with attendant indexes, was published. (In

1955 a revised edition was issued as a result of

increasing community demand for a version that would

incorporate information gathered from the scientists

after they were released and repatriated.)

The Register's chief intelligence support activity

during the 1954-55 period was the compilation and

publication of CD #19, a biographic intelligence research

aid covering the International Conference on the Peaceful

Uses of Atomic Energy, which convened at Geneva during

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August 1955.   CD #19, <u>Who's Who</u>, "Atoms-for-Peace" Con-

ference, Geneva, August 1955, contained narrative bio-

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Travelers and Still More Files

25X1A   In 1955 [blank] Deputy Chief of BR, and

25X1A   [blank] Chief of the Non-Soviet Branch, went to

Europe to survey all available captured files on scien-

tists, technicians and economists and assume possession

of biographic material therein before the expected im-

plementation of restrictive measures subsequent to rat-

25X1A

biographic material required for the successful revision

25X6   of CD #8; and to visit the [blank]

to review methods and procedures and

become familiar with the general file content.

Another team of travelers visited Europe in the fall of

25X1A   1957 [blank] Chief of the Soviet Branch, and [blank]   25X1A

25X1A   [blank] Projects Officer in that Branch. ~~As previous~~

~~travelers had done~~, they, too, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ visited

foreign installations believed to have biographic intel-

ligence potential and determined the availability of bio-

graphic materials to which BR had not previously had access.

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They also determined how BR could increase the

effectiveness of its support of the field elements of CIA

and other components of the intelligence community abroad;

and familiarized themselves with the nature of field

installations and problems of field operations, with

the use being made of BR research aids in the field, and

with the difficulties involved in the free flow of infor-

mation between headquarters and the field.

Another new file was instituted in 1957--the Inter-

national Conference File. This collection began at the

request of the International Conference Branch of the

Liaison and Collection Division, which was seeking a

permanent repository for source materials used in compiling

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was initiated for personalities from the Soviet satellites,
Communist China [ ] 1960 the travel of
scientific personnel from the remaining foreign countries to
the Soviet bloc and China was being indexed in the same
manner.

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In early 1958 [ ] ~~Chief of the Non-Soviet
Branch~~ was chosen for a slot in the DDI Strategic Branch,

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[ ] where he remained for 4 years, becoming Branch
Chief in 1961. While ~~in Frankfurt~~ there he performed current
intelligence support duties concerning the Soviet bloc,
Africa, the Middle East and Western Europe. He also
served as OCR representative [ ] helping Station and

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Base officials to obtain assistance from the central reference
system and monitoring the flow of intelligence from t[ ]

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area to the DDI consumers.

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In November 19[ ] Chief of the Western Section,
Non-Soviet Branch, left for a monthlong tour of major West
European countries. Hers was the first trip by a BR official
that was oriented primarily toward area familiarization rather
than file searching and other work activities. [ ] did,

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however, brief officials at various CIA, State[ ]

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installations on potential biographic support from BR and alert
them to BR's continuing field requirements. In the years to come,
her trip was followed by many others, to all parts of the world.
Although the first such trips were taken by fairly high level
officials, it eventually became standard procedure for analysts
on the journeyman level to visit their areas of responsibility
at some point in their careers.

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DCID 1/9

On 17 December 1958 a major event occurred in the
progress of biographic information handling in the intel-
ligence community. This was the issuance, under the
sponsorship of CODIB, of DCID 1/**9**. This Directive, in
effect, combined the provisions of CIG 16 and NSCID 8
and for the first time allocated community responsibility
for the maintenance of biographic data on foreign person-
alities in all spheres. The specific division was to
State for political, politico-economic, social and
cultural figures; to the Departments of the Army, Navy
and Air Force for military, naval and air force personnel,
respectively; and to CIA for scientific, technical and
technico-economic personalities. Each department or
agency was assigned the responsibility for producing,
evaluating or making available to authorized recipients
biographic intelligence on persons within its own categories
of responsibility. (DCID 1/9)

During 1959 BR began to control contact between scientists
and technicians of different countries in a system similar to
the one used for conferences and travel. The contact system
had its origins in a manual index of 3x5 cards listing contacts
between East and West Germans and the scientists of other
countries. [ ] Section had begun this file
in response to operational requirements from the field. Additional
operational requirements being levied on BR as a whole, as
well as an increased interest in contact information in the
community, made it desirable for the file to be shifted to

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machine control and expanded to include all foreign countries.

In July 1959 BR's Chief, [_____] departed for a

25X1 10-month course [_____] In his absence

25X1A [_____] served as Acting Chief, and in July 1960

25X1A [_____] ecame Chief in his own right when [_____] upon

his return to OCR, was transferred to become Chief of SR.

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[_____]

library system.)

BR-BI Merger

In 1961 ~~a major~~ the biggest change yet took place in the biographic
community--~~the merger of~~ State/BI merged with CIA/BR. During
1952-61 State had steadily cut back on its support to BI
until by early 1961 CIA was funding over 75 percent of
BI's positions (29/supported by BR; 22 by the NIS program). slots
After the Kennedy administration took office, State officials
reviewed the Department's role in intelligence operations and
instituted a reorganization in INR. At that time, the new
Director of INR, Roger Hilsman, decided that the biographic
function could be more effectively handled by CIA and pro-
posed that the BI files and available personnel be transferred
to BR.

After some hesitation, primarily concerned with the
necessity for acquiring new personnel and finding a place for
them in the new building at Langley, CIA accepted the proposal.
The formal shift of administrative responsibility took place on 1 July 1961,
although the physical relocation was delayed until November,

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after OCR moved to the new Headquarters' building.   BR

The first problem related to the merger was that of
                              BI's
personnel.   Of ~~Statanhx~~ T/O of 67, only 56 were actually

on board.   This number was further reduced for many

                    BI
reasons--several ~~State~~ employees were Foreign Service

                    others simply
Officers; many ~~persons~~ did not wish to transfer to CIA;

Some
~~others~~ were found unacceptable for security or professional

reasons.   The number of State employees who actually made

the shift was 10--six professionals and four clericals.

To bring the "new BR" up to strength, seven ~~recruiting~~

teams, composed of representatives from both BR and the

Office of Personnel, canvassed colleges and universities

in an intensive recruiting campaign.   Within 9 months the

Register was up to strength, although it took somewhat

longer to provide the newcomers with area and language

knowledge through training courses and on-the-job ~~training~~

experience.

While recruiting was in progress and plans for the

move to Langley were being made, selected Branch Chiefs

and analysts from BR were detailed to State to gain

firsthand experience with the political files, processing
                                    After completion of the transfer
and service procedures then in use in BI.   These indivi-

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duals ▓▓▓▓▓▓ trained the remaining BR analysts, as well as those who came in from the recruiting campaign, ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓.

As soon as agreement on the merger was reached, work began on a revision of DCID 1/9. The new version, issued on 26 October 1961, gave responsibility to CIA for maintenance of biographic information and production of biographic intelligence on foreign personalities in all fields except military; the latter went to the Department of Defense. Responsibility for the collection of biographic data was also spelled out: State would collect information on all but military figures, and Defense would collect on military personalities and on scientific, technical and economic figures associated with activities of primary interest to the Department. (DCID 1/9 revised) This collection pattern had long been in existence, but the formal responsibility for it had not previously been designated.

The BR-PI merger made an enormous impact on BR's operations. First, of course, was the significant increase in the amount of reporting to be processed and the number and kinds of requests. Processing criteria were also necessarily changed. Fortunately, processing methods could remain essentially the same--State's files were controlled by manual methods, but the dossiers used were the same size as those used in BR, so that physical merger was easy. Some of the newly acquired dossiers were eventually converted to machine control; others, primarily in the Latin America and the Near East/Africa areas, were not.

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State's 4x6 card files were reviewed after the transfer

and destroyed or gradually merged into the 5x8 files,

either by being pasted to a larger card, by being placed

in a 5x8 pouch, or by being ~~reproduced by a photographic~~ photographically enlarged.

~~method in a 5x8 size.~~

In addition to the dossiers and card files, BR ~~also~~

inherited State's category files for each country. These

listed incumbents of various important positions, such as

Cabinet officials or diplomats. There were also a number

of background or group folders. BR had a few of these

already, on scientific institutions and ~~groups,~~ organizations, but the

political function necessitated the maintenance of many

more--for example, folders on political parties or

groups, labor organizations, subversive activities,

elections, and cultural or religious bodies. Increased

acquisition of the number of reference works, foreign and

domestic newspapers and other open-source materials was

also necessary.

With the takeover of the ~~new~~ State functions, BR assumed a

new pattern of response oriented toward current intelligence

and quick-reaction support in answering requests, the total

number of which had increased about 300 percent over that of

the previous year. Non-CIA requesters, originally comprising

about a third of the total, now represented about half, with

State the major customer. A noticeable change in the type of

service provided also took place. Previously, ~~BR provided~~ BR provided

the bulk of ~~its~~ its service ~~was~~ in the form of oral responses to

queries or machine printouts and by making its files available

for inspection. After the merger, the number of requests for

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written biographic summaries and full reports, as well as the
number of spot answer telephonic requests, increased sharply.

New Publications

BR had for years been publishing compilations of data on
individuals attending scientific conferences throughout the
world. Now it took on State's responsibility for attendees
at all kinds of international gatherings. A major annual
project, for example, was the preparation of biographies on
foreign delegates to the UN General Assembly sessions. In
addition, BR now had to produce briefing book biographies for
high-level US officials (especially the President and Vice
President) traveling abroad or entertaining foreign visitors.
These were coordinated with OCI, which had overall responsibility
for White House briefing books.

BR's publication responsibilities changed in nature and
increased greatly after the merger. Most previous publications
had been Reference Aids (prior to 1957 Research Aids), though
occasionally Biographic Intelligence Bulletins (BBs) were issued
on individual scientists. After 1961 BR issued many BBs and
Biographic Intelligence Reports (BRs) on individuals or groups
of individuals who had attained--or were contending for--sig-
nificant positions at home or abroad. Such publications were
sometimes in answer to specific requests, usually from State,
and sometimes in response to standing requirements of the intel-
ligence community. They were primarily on figures of the Western
world, whereas the scientifically oriented publications had been
mainly on personalities from Communist countries

Scientific publications were not, of course, abandoned.
For example, in September 1962 the Register published the ambitious
Chinese Communist Men of Science, containing approximately

technicians plus a three-way personality index--by organ-

izational affiliation, by field of scientific specialty

and by those who had studied in the USSR.

State had published a variety of reference works of

the directory or list type, and PR now integrated these

into its RA series. Chief among these was the directory

of party and government officials in a given Communist country.

Such directories, published on an irregular basis, were

responsive to the requirements of DDP, DDI/OCI and the

Foreign Service.

Probably the most useful of the RAs was a volume

called <u>Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign

Governments</u>. State had issued this on an irregular

basis, but PR found that by the use of EAM techniques it could make

<u>Chiefs of State</u> a monthly, thus greatly increasing its

usefulness. (<u>Chiefs of State</u> was transferred to compu-

terized control in 1972.) Demand for this publication

more than doubled in its first 4 years--from 568 copies of

the August 1962 issue to 1,443 copies in September 1966.

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Br chapter

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~~SECRET~~

Special Projects

Coinciding with BR's first year of responsibility for political biographicproduction was the buildup of arms in Communist Cuba. BR became deeply involved in providing service to Task Force W (TFW), which was set up to monitor the Cuban situation. Early in 1962 BR produced for TFW/a directory of Cuban diplomatic per-
(and other potential requesters)
sonnel, which could be used to locate potential sources, and a directory of Cuban Government officials. During the October missile crisis BR compiled a five-volume publication on persons who might have been qualified for Cuban Government posts had Castro been overthrown. The volumes contained 1,374 biographic sketches plus an occupational index to the individuals. The entire project was completed within 2 weeks, with the help of analysts and clerical personnel from all divisions of the Register, working until 10:00 every night, 7 days a week.

At some point during 1962, at the request of CI Staff, BR began a new machine file to control information on African students at schools in the Soviet bloc.

In late 1963 the military overthrew the South Vietnamese Government of President Ngo Dinh Diem, touching off a whole series of coups over the next few years. BR produced many biographies, often on a crash basis, for the DDI Task Force

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Production of biographic reports for the NIS Key Person-
alities (KP) section, as well as biographic briefs for
Section 57 (Subversion). In late 1962 BR recommended major
changes in the KP program. The existing situation was that
BR wrote the biographies and then submitted them to OBI,
which had inherited from State the job of coordinating the
NIS at about the same time BR and BI merged. OBI then edited
the biographies and scheduled them for production. BR often
took 6 months to a year to write a collection of biographies
for a particular KP, and OBI often took an equal amount of
time for its editing and processing procedures. Thus, a KP
section was often out of date by the time it reached the
consumer, particularly if it was on one of the developing
nations that were constantly in ferment. Moreover, all
but about six major countries (such as the USSR and China)
were issued in bound volumes and were scheduled for updating
only once every 4 years. Even the six looseleaf KPs were
updated only biannually.

The Chief of BR [   ] therefore proposed that
the format and content of the KP section be drastically
changed. First, he felt that all sections should be loose-
leaf, to facilitate updating. Then he suggested that the
number of personalities--then ranging from about 100 for
the smaller countries to about 750 for the USSR--be greatly
reduced. Length, too, he said should be reduced to make
the reports more meaningful and again to facilitate updating.
Updated reports on individuals included should then be
disseminated automatically for addition to the original set.

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Thus, a KP would contain data on individuals of

current signficance as well as on those of background

interest.

[   ] suggestions were to lead to the divorce of

the biographic section from the NIS and the appearance of

a new publication--the Biographic Handbook (BH). In

April 1963 the AD/CR (Borel) succeeded in having BR made

the responsible office for providing scheduled biographic

reports to components of the government that previously

relied on the KP. USIB approved the action on the grounds

that biographic intelligence was not basic intelligence and

that BR, by virtue of its methods and capabilities, could

automatically provide updating increments to previously

issued country handbooks as a by-product of its routine

production. (BR did, however, continued to write the NIS Section 57 briefs.)

Although it did serve the same customers as had the

KP, the BH was not tied to the NIS program but was controlled

completely by BR. All BHs were looseleaf in form, with

permanent covers, so that supplements could be easily added

at any time. Theoretically, once a core set of reports was

written, supplements would be added quarterly. In fact,

however, such rigid scheduling proved impracticable. In

some countries, matters were so stable that quarterly

supplements were not needed. In others, where government

upheavals and coups were almost routine, whole new sets of

reports were needed at frequent intervals. Such government

changes often engendered either large numbers of ad hoc reports

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written for specific requests or publications (PBs or BRs)
on the new government leaders.

Because all of the Register's reports were done in the
same format, it was a simple matter to reproduce them for
BH supplements. Sometimes updating was necessary, but often
the only change was to substitute a photograph of the person
for the OCR/BR seal that was printed in the upper righthand
corner of each report. Not all supplements were readymade,
of course. In most cases, at periodic intervals analysts
wrote new reports on individuals who had attained prominente
since the last batch for that country or updated previous BH
reports on persons still prominent. (As of 1972, only seven
or eight countries remain without cores, and supplements are
produced on five to nine countries per month.)

Activities of the Mid-1960's

In 1964, by order of the DDI, six categories of pub-
lications were established as DDI standards for all fin-
ished intelligence publications issued by Offices within
the Directorate. All BR publications were therefore sub-
sequently issued as DDI publications. The three that con-
cerned BR were the Intelligence Brief (formerly the Bulletin),
the Intelligence Report and the Intelligence Research Aid.

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Overshadowing other events in 1965 was BR's con-

tribution to the DDI Task Force on the Dominican Republic,

established after the April rebellion in that country.

During the early postrebellion period, the ~~responsible~~ Latin American (LA)

Section

~~desk~~ in BR operated almost around the clock answering

urgent requests (almost 600 per month for a time) and

preparing biographies of individuals who emerged "out

of the woodwork" into positions of leadership. An extraordinarily high

request level for the Dominican Republic continued for over a year.

At one point during the Dominican crisis two men

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weeks to prepare a definitive list of those Communists

identified as active in the rebellion. On 19 July 1965

the DCI (Raborn) presented their material to the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, referring to the files as

"the definitive documentary evidence of Communist involve-

ment in the Dominican Republic."

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The Dominican crisis had several long-term consequences

for BR. First of all, it revealed a number of deficiencies

in Agency and community control of biographic information,

causing the ADDI to request a staff study on the subject

of coordination of OCR biographic information services.

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At this juncture, the D/CR, already concerned ~~about the~~

~~possibility~~ that a requester might not be getting all avail-

able biographic data or that he might be making several calls

to various OCR divisions to get it, ordered the Chiefs of BR

and SR to coordinate requests for biographic data among all

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appropriate OCR components unless the requester ordered

them not to. ("All appropriate components" included, in

addition to BR and SR, the Library, for open-source

information, and GR, for photographs of foreign personalities.)

During the course of the survey of biographic service

coordination, BR showed that it also derived information

from OCI, ORR and OSI--usually from personal knowledge of

individuals assigned to those offices--and to some extent

from the operational files of DDP. The latter, however,

were a considerable source of problems. DDP understandably

did not want BR to have truly operational information, nor did

BR want to have it. What BR did want was the nonoperational

biographic material that could be extracted from DDP files--

and this DDP was reluctant to turn loose. Some such infor-

mation was acquired by individual BR desk analysts, if they

had particularly good relationships with their DDP counter-

parts. Also, during crises such as that in the Dominican

Republic, DDP was good about allowing BR to use its files.

Periodic discussions would be held to consider the problem

of the DDP nonoperational biographic data, but no real

cooperation from DDP was to be forthcoming until 1967.

In addition to deriving information from its own

components and other Agency offices, BR often collected data

to answer requests from other US Government systems, such as

DIA (military biographies), the Library of Congress (biographic

information from open sources) and the National Library of

Medicine (biographic information on life scientists from open

sources.)

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Another consequence of the Dominican crisis besides

the review of biographic coordination was the initiation
President's
by the Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC) of the prep-   -- later the
                                                                        Interdepartmental
aration of contingency papers on the politically unstable   Regional Group)

countries of Latin America for the White House. Included

for each country was a list of personalities who would or

might be of significance in the event of a political turn-

over. PR analysts met with OCI and DDP counterparts to
                                    The   then
prepare the initial lists, after which the PR analysts prepared

reports on the listed personalities (usually including

DDP information), which were then transmitted to the field
                                            Short Term
for comment. The reports finally became part of the contingency plan
drawn up by the LAPC for each of the Latin American countries.

In February 1966, because of reduced resources, PR

decentralized the International Conference File. The

existing file was deactivated and transferred to the CIA

Library. Subsequent reports dealing with conferences were

indexed according to the ISC and were retrievable through

the Intellofax System.

In April 1966 DDI Notice 5-100-7 reduced the categories

of DDI publications from six to three--Intelligence Memo-
        (replaced the Briefs)
randums, Intelligence Reports and Handbooks. (N 5-100-7)

PR's Research Aids did not meet the definition of finished

intelligence and were subsequently produced as OCR

Reference Aids.

On various occasions in the past problems had arisen

with regard to duplication of effort between PR and OCI,

which sometimes produced current intelligence reports

that were essentially biographic, thus causing hard feelings

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have written the report. Methods of avoiding such duplication were discussed by officials of both Offices. The above-mentioned DDI Notice stated, among other things, that "Finished intelligence is usually fully coordinated within the DDI and with other Directorates as appropriate." In August 1966 the Directors of OCR and OCI signed an agreement providing the specific terms under which their Offices would effect such DDI coordination. This agreement provided that no matter which office received a request for a formal biographic report that would be issued as finished intelligence, BR would produce the report in accordance with its responsibilities under DCID 1/9. BR would ~~then~~ coordinate the report with the interested OCI analyst(s) and with other offices as needed. A notation of the producing office and the ~~differences~~ nature and extent of coordination would be ~~make~~ made in the foreword or on the first page of the text. Self-initiated publications were to be coordinated in the same manner. If both Offices contributed material toward a single publication, a notation of ~~their contribution and~~ the extent of coordination between them was to be made in the foreword or in a footnote. Biographic Handbooks, though classed as finished intelligence, were considered to be "scheduled production" and did ~~were~~ not have ~~required~~ to be coordinated. (agreement OCI-OCR)

Potential Leaders Program

The Dominican crisis and similar situations in other countries had pointed up a notable deficiency in the biographic program--a lack of information on ~~potential~~ emerging leaders, particularly in the developing nations.

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Throughout 1966 discussions went on in the intelligence

community to see what could be done about this gap. Too

often had policymakers been left in the dark when no

biographic information was available in Washington on

individuals suddently catapulted to power in coups or

other upheavals. The situation must be corrected.

Within CIA this lack was of special concern to the

DDP, the late Desmond Fitzgerald, under whose direction

work began on the development of a program for improving

the reporting of positive biographic information on

potential leaders throughout the world. As a prelim-

inary to such a program, the Chief of DDP Reports Control

issued a memorandum to all Chief Reports Officers to ensure

that all biographic information of positive intelligence

value did indeed reach the appropriate community repository--

DIA for military figures; OCR/BR for all others--from which

it could be retrieved as needed. The memorandum stated that

field information reports that were not to receive general

dissemination but that did contain substantial biographic

information were to be disseminated to OCR/PR--or, if they

concerned military figures, to both DIA and OCR/BR--as one-

copy, nonreproduced CSDT reports. All other nondisseminated

field reports were to be reviewed for such fragmentary

biographic data on personalities of positive intelligence value

as would contribute to OCR/BR and DIA biographic files. This

information, too, was to be forwarded to the correct repository.

This was the first official, across-the-board attempt to get
  biographic
positive/intelligence out of DDP files into places where it

could be used for other than operational purposes.

In February 1967, after extensive interagency
planning and coordination, the Potential Leaders Bio-
graphic Reporting List (PLBRL) program was born. This
program called for the improvement and increased col-
lection of biographic information on potential leaders
in most foreign countries, particularly in the new and
emerging nations and in the countries of Latin America.
The program called for participation of Foreign Service,
Department of Defense and CIA collectors in the preparation
(and periodic revision) of a target list of potential
leaders for each country, with their collection efforts to
be coordinated within the context of the Country Team.
Appropriate collection guidance support was to be pro-
vided by PR, in conjunction with other components of
~~StateInRexausinkexk~~ State/INR, with the State Country
Director concerned, and with DIA.

By the end of FY 1967, 77 PLBRLs had been received from
the field; BR had coordinated community responses to 10 of
these country lists, surveyed biographic holdings on the
personalities involved, and communicated its findings to the
appropriate Embassies and Legations for action. (Aug 67 PFIAB contrib)
The program has continued to date, becoming an ever more
valuable addition to the other biographic programs in the
community.

The End of BR

In July 1967 BR vanished as a separate entity during the
reorganization of OCR into the new Central Reference Service,
which was organized along geographic rather than functional
lines. Biographic work has since been

of the CRS country desk analyst. Though these analysts now
have many nonbiographic duties, the latter often aid in giving
them a better picture of the country and therefore aid in
better biographic products. Most of the old BR activities have
continued--the BH and PLPRL programs have grown steadily.
Intelligence Memorandums and Reports have increased in
quality and quantity, as have White House Briefing Books.
CRS no longer submits briefing book biographies to OCI for
inclusion in their overall books, Some briefing books are
coordinated with the State Department Country Desks, but
CRS maintains final control over the content and printing
of the reports. Finished biographic intelligence has been
standardized throughout CRS since the establishment in 1969
of a Production Control Staff to edit publications and VIP
reports.

though such biographies are usually coordinated with OCI.

The CRS analyst no longer suffers under the shadow of
the "reference type" of old. In 1970 CRS assumed the NSA
biographic service responsibility, and as of 1972 the
feasibility of transferring the DIA military biographic
program to CRS is under exploration. A "national bio-
graphic center" for all positive intelligence on foreign
personalities may not be so far away as it once
seemed.

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